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Abstract We employ the theory of rational choice to examine whether observable
choices from feasible sets of prospects can be generated by the optimization of some
underlying decision criterion under uncertainty. Rather than focusing on a specific the-
ory of choice, our objective is to formulate a general approach that is designed to cover
the various decision criteria that have been proposed in the literature. We use a mild
dominance property to define a class of suitable choice criteria. In addition to ration-
alizability per se, we characterize transitive and Suzumura consistent rationalizability
in the presence of dominance.
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1 Introduction
It is by now well-established that the choice behavior of an economic agent can be
considered more fundamental than the optimization of some objective. An agent’s
choices can be observed directly and, recognizing this early on in the development
of demand analysis, Samuelson (1938, 1948) laid the foundations of what has come
to be known as revealed preference theory; see also Houthakker (1950), among oth-
ers. A consumer’s demand function is taken as the primitive of the problem and the
basic question is whether the observable behavior of this agent is consistent with the
standard hypothesis of utility maximization under budget constraints. Although these
early contributions restricted attention to consumer choice in perfectly competitive
markets, the theory of rational choice progressed rapidly and more general choice
scenarios were analyzed in contributions such as those of Richter (1966), Hansson
(1968) and Suzumura (1976a, 1977). Initially, the analysis of rational choice behavior
focused on models where a rationalizing relation was assumed to be an ordering but,
more recently, weaker coherence properties of a rationalization have been considered;
see, for instance, Richter (1971) for an early contribution in this spirit. A detailed
review of rational choice and revealed preference theory can be found in Bossert and
Suzumura (2010).
Numerous theories of choice under uncertainty have emerged over the years; prom-
inent examples include proposals by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Milnor
(1954), Savage (1954), Barberà et al. (1984), Barberà and Pattanaik (1984) andKannai
and Peleg (1984). Both probabilistic and non-probabilistic choice models (such as set-
based models) are covered by these and other contributions. In this paper, we aim at
combining the theory of rational choice with a general approach to choice situations
under uncertainty.
In decision problems under certainty, the revealed preference approach typically
does not try to uncover a specific objective the optimization of which may be revealed
through theobserved choices; rather, the fundamental question iswhether these choices
are consistent with some objective in the sense that the choices from each feasible set
are the greatest elements according to a rationalizing relation. Analogously, we do not
want to restrict ourselves to a specific theory of choice under uncertainty. Our basic
question is whether observable choices can be consistent with some coherent way of
making decisions in the presence of uncertainty. We therefore use as our primitive a
set of prospects. Suppose there is a universal set X (with at least two members) of
certain outcomes and a finite number of (at least two) possible states of the world. A
prospect assigns to each possible state an outcome in X . We can think of a prospect
as the result of an action taken by an agent before the uncertainty regarding the state
that actually occurs is resolved. The reason why we choose prospects to provide a
fundamental description of our choice situations is the generality we aim to achieve:
if we were, for instance, to use lotteries as the objects to be chosen from, we would
already be committed to a probabilistic choice model. Because we do not want to rule
out non-probabilistic models such as those examined by Milnor (1954) and Barberà
and Pattanaik (1984), for instance, we choose to use prospects as our basic representa-
tion of choice situations under uncertainty. However, models that do endow a decision
maker with a probability distribution are included as special cases in our approach.
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The definition of a decision rule that we use in this paper is based on what we
think is a minimal requirement. Given a choice function defined on a domain of sets
of feasible prospects, we first demand that there be a relation that rationalizes the
observable choices in the usual sense of generating them as greatest elements in the
requisite feasible set. In addition, we ask that the rationalization satisfy a dominance
property so as to be interpretable as a choice rule under uncertainty. The dominance
condition is easily described: if two prospects x = (x1, . . . , xm) and y = (y1, . . . , ym)
are such that, for every state i and for every state j , the certain prospect (xi , . . . , xi )
that repeats outcome xi in x over all states is revealed to be at least as good as the
certain prospect (y j , . . . , y j ) that repeats outcome y j in y over all states, then prospect
x must be at least as good as prospect y. This is a very weak requirement because we
do not demand state-by-state dominance to be respected but, instead, merely unam-
biguous dominance where the worst possible certain outcome in x is at least as good
at the best possible certain outcome in y. Although this condition that we impose in
addition to rationalizability per se is rather mild, it does impose further restrictions,
as is shown once our formal framework is introduced.
There is a resemblance to the analysis carried out by Bossert (2001) who also exam-
ines rationalizability in the context of uncertainty. However, Bossert (2001) restricts
attention to set-based models whereas our approach is considerably more general.
Because of the more specialized framework, Bossert’s (2001) restrictions differ from
our dominance property.
In the next section,we define the fundamentals of the problem to be addressed in this
paper, namely, the notions of prospects and choice functions. Section 3 provides neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for dominance rationalizability (that is, rationalizability
by a relation that respects the above-described dominance requirement). In Sects. 4 and
5, we add the coherence properties of transitivity and of Suzumura consistency, respec-
tively, to the list of requirements imposed on a rationalization. Section 6 concludes.
2 Prospects and choice functions
Suppose there is a set of alternatives or outcomes X with at least two elements. X
could be finite or infinite. There are m ∈ N \ {1} possible states of the world and a
prospect x = (x1, . . . , xm)with xi ∈ X for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m} specifies, for each state,
the alternative that materializes in this state. The set of all prospects is denoted by
Xm . Important special cases of prospects are the certain prospects in which the same
outcome emerges in all possible states. For any x ∈ X , the certain prospect associated
with alternative x is the m-tuple (x, . . . , x) and we will denote this m-tuple by x1m .
The set of all non-empty subsets of Xm is X .
A (binary) relation on Xm is a subset R of the Cartesian product Xm × Xm and the
asymmetric part of R is P(R). The transitive closure tc(R) of a relation R on Xm is
tc(R) = {(x, y) | there exist K ∈ N and x0, . . . , xK ∈ Xm such that
[x = x0 and (xk−1, xk) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K } and xK = y]}.
The transitive closure of a relation R is the smallest transitive relation containing R.
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A relation R is Suzumura consistent if and only if, for all K ∈ N and for all
x, y ∈ Xm ,
(x, y) ∈ tc(R) ⇒ (y, x) ∈ P(R).
The Suzumura consistent closure sc(R) of a relation R is given by
sc(R) = R ∪ {(x, y) | (x, y) ∈ tc(R) and (y, x) ∈ R}.
Suzumura consistency was first introduced in Suzumura (1976b). Analogous to the
transitive closure of a relation, the Suzumura consistent closure of R is the smallest
Suzumura consistent relation containing R. The notion of a Suzumura consistent clo-
sure is due to Bossert et al. (2005). See Bossert and Suzumura (2010) for a detailed
discussion of Suzumura consistency and its use in individual and collective choice.
We assume that, in the presence of uncertainty, a decision maker faces a set of fea-
sible actions and that each action leads to a prospect in Xm . Rather than working with
actions and their induced prospects, we work with prospects directly in order to sim-
plify our exposition. Thus, a choice rule under uncertainty can be expressed by means
of a choice function that selects, from each feasible set of prospects in its domain, a
non-empty subset of this feasible set. The only assumption (other than non-emptiness)
that we make about the domain  of a choice function is that it includes all singletons
and pairs of certain prospects. Formally, a choice function with a certainty inclusive
domain is a mapping C :  → X such that {{x1m, y1m} | x, y ∈ X} ⊆  ⊆ X
and C(S) ⊆ S for all S ∈ . Because the certainty inclusiveness assumption will be
maintained throughout the paper, we will simply refer to C as a choice function with
the understanding that this function has a certainty inclusive domain.
3 Dominance rationalizability
As is well-known, a choice function C is rationalizable by a binary relation R on Xm if
andonly if, for each feasible set of prospects S in the domain,C selects the R-greatest
elements in S. However, in the present context of choice under uncertainty, we might
want to imposemore than just the standard rationalizability property in order to think of
a choice function as representing a plausible method of selecting from sets of available
prospects. Clearly, there are many theories of choice under uncertainty such as those
pioneered and discussed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Milnor (1954),
Savage (1954), Fishburn (1970), Arrow and Hurwicz (1972), Gärdenfors (1976), Kim
and Roush (1980), Barberà et al. (1984), Barberà and Pattanaik (1984), Kannai and
Peleg (1984), Barberà et al. (2004), to name but a few.
The main purpose of the approach advocated in this paper is not the identification
of a specific theory of choice under uncertainty but, rather, to define a more general
criterion that subsumes many of the models proposed so far. Clearly, this means that
our definition of possible choice rules is quite permissive. In addition to probabilis-
tic choice rules such as those proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) or
Savage (1954), our class of choice rules includes many others that are not based on
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(objective or subjective) probabilities, such as those discussed by Milnor (1954) or
Kannai and Peleg (1984), for instance. Of course, our definition of possible choice
rules still has some bite in that it allows us to eliminate rules that we consider unac-
ceptable given our interpretation; this is illustrated below via a simple example. As
we discuss in the concluding section, our approach can be amended in a straightfor-
ward and intuitive manner if one desires to come up with a more stringent definition.
What we think of as the major contribution of this paper is the method we propose to
incorporate notions of uncertainty into a model of rational choice.
Coming back to our definition of rationalizability in the current context, we pro-
pose as a minimal requirement that, in addition to rationalizability per se, a weak
dominance property be respected. More precisely, we demand that observed choices
involving certain prospects be respected in the following sense. Consider two pros-
pects x = (x1, . . . , xm) and y = (y1, . . . , ym). If every certain prospect xi 1m with
i ∈ {1, . . . , m} is revealed to be weakly preferred to every certain prospect y j 1m with
j ∈ {1, . . . , m} in the sense that xi 1m is chosen in a situation where y j 1m is feasible,
then the relation rationalizing C must declare x to be at least as good as y. Formally,
we say that a choice function C is dominance rationalizable if and only if there exists
a relation R on Xm such that
C(S) = {x ∈ S | (x, y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S} for all S ∈  (1)
and
[
(xi 1m, y j 1m) ∈ R for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}⇒(x, y) ∈ R
]
for all x, y ∈ Xm . (2)
If C and R are such that (1) and (2) are satisfied, we also say that R is a dominance
rationalization of C or that C is dominance rationalized by R.
Property (1) represents the standard rationalizability requirement: for any feasible
set S in the domain of a choice function C , the set of chosen elements C(S) must
coincide with the set of R-greatest elements in S according to a (dominance) rational-
ization R.
That (2) imposes additional restrictions on C can be seen by considering the fol-
lowing example. Suppose that the set of certain alternatives is X = {x, y, z}, that there
are m = 2 possible states of the world, and the certainty inclusive domain of C is
given by
 = {{(x, x)}, {(y, y)}, {(z, z)},
{(x, x), (y, y)}, {(x, x), (z, z)}, {(y, y), (z, z)},
{(x, y), (y, z)}}.
Now define the choice function C by letting
C({(x, x)}) = {(x, x)}, C({(y, y)}) = {(y, y)}, C({(z, z)}) = {(z, z)},
C({(x, x), (y, y)}) = {(x, x)}, C({(x, x), (z, z)}) = {(x, x)}, C({(y, y), (z, z)}) = {(y, y)},
C({(x, y), (y, z)}) = {(y, z)}.
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Consider the relation R on Xm defined by
R = {((x, x), (x, x)), ((y, y), (y, y)), ((z, z), (z, z)),
((x, x), (y, y)), ((x, x), (z, z)), ((y, y), (z, z)),
((y, z), (x, y))}.
It is straightforward to verify that (1) is satisfied for C and R. However, there exists
no relation R′ such that, for C and R′, (2) is satisfied in addition to (1). By way
of contradiction, suppose R′ is such a relation. First of all, as a consequence of (1)
and the definition of C , we must have ((x, x), (y, y)) ∈ R′, ((y, y), (y, y)) ∈ R′,
((x, x), (z, z)) ∈ R′ and ((y, y), (z, z)) ∈ R′. Thus, (2) implies ((x, y), (y, z)) ∈ R′.
Therefore, the prospect (x, y) is an R′-greatest element in {(x, y), (y, z)} and (1)
demands that (x, y) ∈ C({(x, y), (y, z)}), in contradiction to the definition of C .
Thus, even though the additional property that we require of a rationalization in the
context of choice under uncertainty is very weak, it is not redundant and can be used
to eliminate rules that are in violation of the basic dominance condition (2).
Richter (1971) characterizes rational choice in a general setting where no addi-
tional requirements such as that expressed by (2) are imposed. In our framework, an
analogous result can be obtained by modifying his necessary and sufficient condition
in a suitable manner. To do so, we first introduce the notion of the direct revealed
preference relation RdC associated with a choice function C . This relation is defined
by letting, for all x, y ∈ Xm ,
(x, y) ∈ RdC ⇔ there exists S ∈  such that
[
x ∈ C(S) and y ∈ S] .
Because we have to take into account the dominance property in addition to mere
rationalizability, we consider the following relation that incorporates this require-
ment. The direct revealed preference and dominance relation RC corresponding to C
is defined by letting, for all x, y ∈ Xm ,
(x, y) ∈ RC ⇔ (x, y) ∈ RdC or
[
(xi 1m, y j 1m) ∈ RdC for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}
]
.
Following Samuelson’s (1938, 1948) observation in the context of rationality in
consumer choice problems, Richter (1971) establishes that the direct revealed pref-
erence relation RdC associated with a choice function C must be respected by any
rationalizing relation R in the sense that RdC is contained in R. An analogous result
is valid in our setting. However, because of the additional dominance requirement we
impose, the relation RC rather than RdC must be respected when choices are made from
sets of feasible prospects. This leads to the following result, which is analogous to the
above-mentioned observation due to Richter (1971).
Lemma 1 If a choice function C is dominance rationalized by a relation R, then
RC ⊆ R.
Proof Suppose that R is a dominance rationalization of C and that (x, y) ∈ RC . By
definition of RC , there are two possible cases:
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(a) (x, y) ∈ RdC ;
(b) (xi 1m, y j 1m) ∈ RdC for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
In case (a), the definition of RdC implies that there exists S ∈  such that x ∈ C(S)
and y ∈ S. Thus, x is an R-greatest element in S by (1) which, together with y ∈ S,
implies (x, y) ∈ R.
In case (b), the result just established for case (a) implies that (xi 1m, y j 1m) ∈ R
for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. By (2), it follows that (x, y) ∈ R. 
unionsq
We can now use this lemma to characterize dominance rationalizability. Again, the
method of proof is based on that employed by Richter (1971). In our framework, how-
ever, some additional steps are needed as a consequence of imposing the dominance
requirement. The following property of a choice function C turns out to be necessary
and sufficient for dominance rationalizability.
Direct dominance revelation coherence. For all S ∈  and for all x ∈ Xm ,
(x, y) ∈ RC for all y ∈ S ⇒ x ∈ C(S).
Direct dominance revelation coherence requires that the relation RC be respected by
the choice function C . It is relatively straightforward to see that this is indeed nec-
essary for dominance rationalizability. As established in the following theorem, the
property is also sufficient.
Theorem 1 A choice function C is dominance rationalizable if and only if C satisfies
direct dominance revelation coherence.
Proof We first prove the only if part of the equivalence stated in the theorem. Suppose
R is a dominance rationalization of C . Let S ∈  and x ∈ S be such that (x, y) ∈ RC
for all y ∈ S. By Lemma 1, it follows that (x, y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S. Because R
is a dominance rationalization of C , this implies x ∈ C(S) and direct dominance
revelation coherence is established.
To prove the if part of the theorem, suppose that C satisfies direct dominance
revelation coherence. We now show that R = RC is a dominance rationalization of C .
To establish that (1) is satisfied for R = RC , suppose first that S ∈  and x ∈ S
are such that (x, y) ∈ RC for all y ∈ S. Direct dominance revelation coherence
immediately implies x ∈ C(S).
Now suppose that S ∈  and x ∈ S are such that x ∈ C(S). By definition, this
implies (x, y) ∈ RdC for all y ∈ S and, because RdC ⊆ RC , we obtain (x, y) ∈ RC for
all y ∈ S.
Finally, we show that (2) is satisfied for R = RC . Suppose x, y ∈ Xm are such
that (xi 1m, y j 1m) ∈ RC for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. For g ∈ {1, . . . , m}, let (xi 1m)g
denote the gth component of the m-tuple (xi , . . . , xi ). By definition of RC , for each
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, there are two possible cases:
(a) (xi 1m, y j 1m) ∈ RdC ;
(b) ((xi 1m)g, (y j 1m)h) ∈ RdC for all g, h ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
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Because (xi 1m)g = xi and (y j 1m)h = y j for all g, h ∈ {1, . . . , m}, (xi 1m, y j 1m) ∈
RdC follows in both cases. Thus, by definition of RC , we obtain (x, y) ∈ RC and the
proof is complete. 
unionsq
Note that the above proof does not make use of the assumption that C is a choice
function with a certainty inclusive domain; the conclusion of Theorem 1 remains true
if  can be any arbitrary non-empty domain. However, the certainty inclusiveness of
 is crucial for the results to be established in the following two sections.
4 Transitive dominance rationalizability
In traditional choice models that do not involve uncertainty, demanding rationaliz-
ability without any further restrictions on the rationalizing relation can be considered
somewhat unsatisfactory. If, for instance, all rationalizations of a choice function gen-
erate strict preference cycles, it is difficult to think of the choice behavior thus revealed
as coherent. The same reasoning applies to dominance rationalizability in the context
of choosing from feasible sets of prospects: in addition to (1) and (2), one may want
to demand that a dominance rationalization possesses some coherence property such
as the well-established transitivity requirement. In this section, we show how transi-
tivity can be incorporated into our model of choice under uncertainty. Interestingly, as
mentioned at the end of the previous section, the certainty inclusiveness assumption
on the domain of a choice function is important for the main result of this section.
Lemma 1 has a natural counterpart in the transitive setting (see Richter, 1971). All
that needs to be done is to replace the relation RC with its transitive closure tc(RC )
so that we obtain the following result.
Lemma 2 If a choice function C is dominance rationalized by a transitive relation
R, then tc(RC ) ⊆ R.
Proof Suppose that R is a transitive dominance rationalization of C and that (x, y) ∈
tc(RC ). Thus, there exist K ∈ N and x0, . . . , xK ∈ Xm such that x = x0, (xk−1, xk) ∈
RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K } and xK = y. By Lemma 1, it follows that x = x0, (xk−1,
xk) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K } and xK = y. Because R is transitive, we obtain
(x, y) ∈ R. 
unionsq
Our characterization of dominance rationalizability by a transitive relation relies on
the assumption that the domain of C is certainty inclusive. Adapting direct dominance
revelation coherence to the transitive framework considered in this section is straight-
forward and the requisite necessary and sufficient condition is obtained by replacing
RC with its transitive closure tc(RC ).
Transitive dominance revelation coherence. For all S ∈  and for all x ∈ Xm ,
(x, y) ∈ tc(RC ) for all y ∈ S ⇒ x ∈ C(S).
Themain result of this section characterizes dominance rationalizability by a transitive
relation.
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Theorem 2 A choice function C is dominance rationalizable by a transitive relation
if and only if C satisfies transitive dominance revelation coherence.
Proof The proof of the only if part of the theorem is a straightforward adaptation of
the proof of the only if part of Theorem 1; we leave it to the reader to verify that all
that is required is to replace RC with tc(RC ) and Lemma 1 with Lemma 2.
To prove the if part of the theorem, suppose that C satisfies transitive dominance
revelation coherence. We show that R = tc(RC ) is a transitive dominance rationali-
zation of C .
Clearly, R = tc(RC ) is transitive by definition.
To establish that (1) is satisfied for R = tc(RC ), suppose first that S ∈  and
x ∈ S are such that (x, y) ∈ tc(RC ) for all y ∈ S. By transitive dominance revelation
coherence, x ∈ C(S).
Now suppose that S ∈  and x ∈ S are such that x ∈ C(S). By definition, this
implies (x, y) ∈ RdC for all y ∈ S and, because RdC ⊆ RC ⊆ tc(RC ), we obtain
(x, y) ∈ tc(RC ) for all y ∈ S.
Finally, we show that (2) is satisfied for R = tc(RC ). Suppose x, y ∈ Xm are such
that
(xi 1m, y j 1m) ∈ tc(RC ) for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. (3)
Because is a certainty inclusive domain, {xi 1m, y j 1m} ∈  for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
Because tc(RC ) dominance rationalizes C , (3) implies xi 1m ∈ C({xi 1m, y j 1m}) for
all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Thus, by definition of the direct revealed preference relation,
we have (xi 1m, y j 1m) ∈ RdC for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. By definition of RdC , we obtain
(x, y) ∈ RC and, because RC ⊆ tc(RC ), it follows that (x, y) ∈ tc(RC ) = R. 
unionsq
5 Suzumura consistent dominance rationalizability
Full transitivity is often considered too demanding a requirement, especially in (but
not restricted to) the context of collective choice. Thus, it is worthwhile to study
the possibility of obtaining characterization results that employ notions of domi-
nance rationalizability that are weaker than transitive dominance rationalizability and
stronger than mere dominance rationalizability. One possibility to do so is to explore
dominance rationalizability by a Suzumura consistent relation. The reason why we
focus on Suzumura consistency as a suitable weakening of transitivity rather than
on alternative properties such as quasi-transitivity or acyclicity is discussed in the
concluding section of the paper.
As in the previous section, our starting point is an analogue of Lemma 1 where RC
is replaced with its Suzumura consistent closure sc(RC ).
Lemma 3 If a choice function C is dominance rationalized by a Suzumura consistent
relation R, then sc(RC ) ⊆ R.
Proof Suppose that R is a Suzumura consistent dominance rationalization of C and
that (x, y) ∈ sc(RC ). By definition, we can distinguish two cases.
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(a) (x, y) ∈ RC ;
(b) (x, y) ∈ tc(RC ) and (y, x) ∈ RC .
In case (a), Lemma 1 implies (x, y) ∈ R.
In case (b), there exist K ∈ N and x0, . . . , xK ∈ Xm such that x = x0, (xk−1, xk) ∈
RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K } and xK = y. Moreover, (y, x) ∈ RC . By Lemma 1, it
follows that x = x0, (xk−1, xk) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K } and xK = y. Therefore,
(x, y) ∈ tc(RC ). Furthermore, (y, x) ∈ R as a consequence of Lemma 1. If (x, y) ∈ R,
it follows that (y, x) ∈ P(R). Because (x, y) ∈ tc(RC ), this contradicts the Suzumura
consistency of R. Thus, (x, y) ∈ R. 
unionsq
A necessary and sufficient condition for dominance rationalizability by a Suzumura
consistent relation is obtained by employing the Suzumura consistent closure instead
of the transitive closure when formulating the requisite coherence property.
Suzumura consistent dominance revelation coherence. For all S ∈  and for all
x ∈ Xm ,
(x, y) ∈ sc(RC ) for all y ∈ S ⇒ x ∈ C(S).
The proof of our final characterization result is analogous to that of Theorem 2; we
leave it to the reader to verify that all that is required is to replace the transitive closure
with the Suzumura consistent closure and Lemma 2 with Lemma 3.
Theorem 3 A choice function C is dominance rationalizable by a Suzumura con-
sistent relation if and only if C satisfies Suzumura consistent dominance revelation
coherence.
6 Concluding remarks
In traditional models of rational choice on general domains without uncertainty,
rationalizability by a transitive relation is equivalent to rationalizability by a reflexive,
complete and transitive relation; see Richter (1966). The same observation applies to
the current framework. Richter’s (1966) proof technique employs a variant of Szpil-
rajn’s (1930) extension theorem and proceeds by showing that any extension of the
transitive closure of the direct revealed preference relation to a reflexive, complete and
transitive relation also rationalizes C . That the dominance property does not change
this result follows from the assumption that we operate on certainty inclusive domains.
As a consequence of this property, the restriction of the direct revealed preference rela-
tion (and, thus, the restriction of RC ) to the set of certain prospects is already reflexive
and complete. Therefore, no new pairs need to be added to the original relation as a
consequence of the dominance requirement. However, the same argument does not
apply to arbitrary domains because the above-mentioned reflexivity and complete-
ness property of the restriction of RC is not guaranteed without assuming that 
is certainty inclusive. This means that there may exist extensions that do not obey
the restrictions imposed by the definition of dominance rationalizability by a transi-
tive relation, and existential clauses may have to be invoked to formulate necessary
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and sufficient conditions. See Bossert (2001) for analogous observations in the more
restricted framework of set-based decision rules.
In contrast, Suzumura consistent dominance revelation coherence is not sufficient
for dominance rationalizability by a reflexive, complete and Suzumura consistent rela-
tion. This is an immediate consequence of the observation that Suzumura consistency
and transitivity coincide in the presence of reflexivity and completeness; see Suzumura
(1976b).
The reason why we focus on Suzumura consistency as the weakening of transitivity
to be considered is that properties such as quasi-transitivity or acyclicity cannot be
treated in an analogous fashion. This is the case because there is no such thing as a
quasi-transitive or an acyclical closure: if a relation fails to be quasi-transitive or acyc-
lical, there is no uniqueway of defining a unique superset of this relation that possesses
the requisite property. For instance, if x is strictly preferred to y, y is strictly preferred
to z and z is strictly preferred to x, the resulting relation clearly is not acyclical (and, of
course, not quasi-transitive). In order to obtain a superset of this relation that is acyc-
lical, one of the pairs (y, x), (z, y) or (x, z) has to be added to the original relation,
but any one of the three possibilities will do. Analogously, to obtain a quasi-transitive
superset of the relation, two of the three pairs need to be added but, again, any two
will do the job. Thus, there is no well-defined closure operation for these properties
and, as a consequence, a condition that demands such a closure to be respected cannot
be formulated. This observation also applies to dominance rationalizability by itself:
because there does not exist a complete closure of a relation, our condition does not
work if we want to obtain dominance rationalizability by a reflexive and complete
relation. See Bossert and Suzumura (2010) for a detailed discussion of these issues in
the traditional rational choice framework without uncertainty.
Our definition of the class of possible decision rules is very permissive—the dom-
inance requirement appears to be quite uncontroversial. If one intends to come up
with more restrictive notions of suitable decision models, the method suggested here
may be applied to this alternative setting. Because of this observation, we think of
this paper as providing two contributions: in addition to the results that we consider
to be of interest in themselves, we propose a general method that can be employed
when applying theories of rational choice to the analysis of decision making under
uncertainty.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
source are credited.
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